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Johnson v. Martin
Prisoners in Michigan challenged the actions of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) in withdrawing recognition of a religious group known as the Melanic Islamic Palace of the Rising Sun (MIPRS), and designating it as a "Security Threat Group," or STG.
MIPRS was recognized as a religious group within the Michigan prison system in 1983, under terms of a consent decree entered in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. In the late 1990s, MDOC sought termination of the consent decree, which was granted by the court. On January 7, 2000, MDOC designated the Melanics as a "Security Threat Group" (STG), and shortly afterward withdrew the group's recognition as a religious group. Members' religious materials were confiscated, and according to the amended complaint, the Melanics were given until January 25 to renounce their membership. "If a member of the Melanics would not sign a form renouncing his religion, he was designated a STG group member and his custody was increased to a Level V, maximum security," the complaint states.
Plaintiffs acknowledged that "some members of the Melanics have taken actions contrary to their religious beliefs and doctrine," and that "some of these actions have resulted in harm to other prisoners or staff." But they argued that prison policy precludes them from "terminating a member" even though "leaders and/or members of the Melanics have sought to excommunicate certain members who were being disruptive or whose primary interest was to use the Melanic religion for personal gain." They noted that members of other recognized religions have not suffered similar treatment when commiting similar acts, and allege that the Melanics have been singled out "because it is not one of the mainstream recognized religions."
Several suits were filed naming Bill Martin, Director of MDOC, and other department officials as defendants. The first was filed pro se in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, by an inmate named Fingal Johnson. Another was filed in the Eastern District on behalf of Michael Jenkins, the president of MIPRS, by the ACLU Fund of Michigan. In mid-August, 2001, the cases were consolidated and the Jenkins case was transferred to the Western District. Attorney Daniel Manville now represents all of the plaintiffs.
RLUIPA violations had been charged in each case. MDOC was also charged with violating plaintiffs' constitutional rights, including free speech, free exercise of religion, due process and equal protection.
Constitutionality challenged
MDOC challenged the constitutionality of RLUIPA, and filed motions for partial summary judgment and dismissal. Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss.
On October 30, 2001, he Becket Fund filed an amicus curiae brief in opposition to defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, defending the constitutionality of RLUIPA. It was the first time The Becket Fund has entered a RLUIPA case involving the institutionalized persons portion of the statute.
In April, 2002, U.S. Magistrate Judge Timothy P. Greeley issued a report and recommendation which upheld the constitutionality of RLUIPA, saying it "does not promote a religious belief or message, but rather frees religious groups to practiced their religious beliefs as they would have without unnecessary governmental regulations."
Constitutionality upheld by U.S. District Court
On September 26, 2002, U.S. District Judge Richard Alan Enslen denied MDOC's motion for partial summary judgment and adopted in full Magistrate Judge Greeley's Report and Recommendation upholding the constitutionality of RLUIPA.
In an accompanying opinion, Judge Enslen noted that "The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and the United States have intervened and filed briefs in support of RLUIPA's constitutionality." He then proceeded to reject each of MDOC's four arguments that RLUIPA was unconstitutional:
He held that RLUIPA meets each prong of the Supreme Court's Lemon test, and thus does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. "In enacting RLUIPA, Congress did nothing to advance or inhibit religion. RLUIPA allows religious groups to practice their religious beliefs without unnecessary governmental regulation. This is as near complete neutrality with respect to religion as is likely possible."
He rejected MDOC's argument that RLUIPA must fail because it does not regulate commercial activity: "RLUIPA is saved by its jurisdictional requirement which establishes the requisite nexus to interstate commerce to satisfy the Commerce Clause."
He rejected MDOC's argument that RLUIPA violates the Spending Clause, holding that: "With respect to RLUIPA, the conditions imposed by Congress relate to Congress' interest in promoting the free exercise of religion and the rehabilitation of prisoners. It appears to this Court that if Congress can restrict highway funds, used to build and repair roads, with a condition mandating a minimum drinking age [a reference to South Dakota v. Dole], Congress can certainly restrict prison funds, used to support rehabilitation and education programs, with a condition mandating accommodation of religious activity."
Because "Congress appropriately enacted RLUIPA under the Commerce Clause [and the] Spending Clause, whether Congress also had the authority to pass RLUIPA under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is irrelevant."
And finally, "As discussed above, Congress is not acting outside the scope of its constitutional authority and so is not violating the Tenth Amendment." RLUIPA does "not interfere with sovereign state functions," but "merely regulates states' activity and gives states the option to comply or forego federal funding."
Judge Enslen's ruling is one of the strongest and most comprehensive federal court opinions to date regarding the constitutionality of RLUIPA, both in general, and as it applies to prisoners. (Johnson v. Martin, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, No. 2:00cv-75)