RLUIPA.org
Recent Decisions Concerning RLUIPA's Prisoner Provisions
A number of courts have recently issued decisions on RLUIPA’s prisoner provisions, upholding RLUIPA’s constitutionality, ruling on the right to possess religious objects, determining RLUIPA’s statute of limitations, and more. A synopsis of these recent decisions follows:
Madison v. Riter:
A federal judge who was the first to declare RLUIPA unconstitutional has now rejected further challenges to its constitutionality. In the case of Ira Madison, a prisoner who claims he was denied kosher meals, Judge James Turk initially ruled that RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause. The Fourth Circuit reversed that ruling, and remanded the case to decide the remaining Constitutional challenges. The State of Virginia claimed that RLUIPA violated the Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments. This time, the court disagreed, holding that RLUIPA is a valid exercise of Congress’ spending power. In doing so, it relied heavily on the Sixth Circuit’s recent decision upholding RLUIPA on the same grounds. The Court went on to find that, because RLUIPA is a valid exercise of Congress’ Spending power, it does not violate the Tenth Amendment or exceed Congress’ power under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also found that Virginia waived its sovereign immunity by accepting federal funds, meaning that the state is subject to suit under RLUIPA’s prisoner provisions, and that RLUIPA does not violate the Eleventh Amendment.
Andreozzi v. Davis:
One of the largest prison systems in the U.S. has recently changed its policy on inmate grooming. On January 17, 2006, emergency policy changes went into effect in the California state prisons. Several months ago, the Ninth Circuit found that the old grooming policy violated RLUIPA. The old grooming policy allowed women to wear long hair for any reason, but prohibited men from wearing long hair even for religious reasons. The new policy allows prisoners to wear their hair at any length so long as it is in a neat, plain style, and to wear beards as specified. In Andreozzi v. Davis, the Eastern District of California took note of these changes and dismissed a RLUIPA claim by a prisoner who sued to force the prisons to change their policy. The court found that the requested accommodation occurred January 17.
Williams v. Gerges:
RLUIPA’s statute of limitations may be longer than that of parallel Constitutional claims, according to the federal district court of the Eastern District of New York. In its recent opinion in Williams v. Gerges, the court dismissed a prisoner’s claims under the Free Exercise Clause and Section 1983, holding that New York’s three-year statute of limitations applied to those claims. But the court allowed the prisoner’s RLUIPA claims to go forward, ruling that RLUIPA was subject to the four-year statute of limitations for civil actions arising under federal law.
(This decision was handed down in June 2005, but was only recently made available online.)
Roy v. Arizona:
In Roy v. Arizona, the court rejected the Arizona Department of Corrections’ claim that its policy on religious objects did not violate RLUIPA. The Department allowed inmates to have as many religious objects as they wished, so long as they were verified and obtained through an approved process and all fit into a 17x10.25x11.5” box. The Department asked the Court to rule in its favor on the policy, but the Court refused, saying more evidence was needed to determine whether the new policy placed a substantial burden on Roy’s religious exercise. During the course of the litigation, the Department had changed its policy on religious items, removing its strict limit on the number of items and allowing them to fit into a larger box. The Court thus dismissed the prisoner’s challenges to the old policy as moot. The court also granted the prison’s summary judgment motion on Roy’s claims involving religious books, holding that the policy which allowed a limited number of books in the prisoner’s cell, but an unlimited number of books in storage, did not substantially burden Roy’s religious exercise.
Johnson v. Martin:
In Jonhson v. Martin, the court rejected the Michigan Department of Correction’s request to reconsider its ruling on religious literature and RLUIPA. The Court previously held that the Department violated RLUIPA by banning all literature from the plaintiff’s religious group, the Melanic Islamic Palace of the Rising Sun. The department had named the Melanic group a “Security Threat Group,” and banned its literature. The federal district court for the Western District of Michigan upheld the Constitutionality of RLUIPA and enjoined the Department from enforcing its ban on Melanic literature. It found that a flat ban (rather than screening individual pieces of mail) was not the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling government interest. In doing so, it also held that RLUIPA offers more protection for inmates’ rights than the balancing test the Supreme Court employed in Turner v. Safley. The court refused to lift the injunction, finding that the Department would likely resume the restrictions if the injunction was lifted.
Wolf v. Turner:
A total ban on prayer feathers violates RLUIPA, the Western District of Arkansas recently held. In Wolf v. Turner, the Western District of Arkansas ruled in favor of an inmate, Billy Joe Wolf, who claimed his religious exercise was burdened by the ban. The court ruled that the burden on religious exercise was substantial, that the total ban was an “exaggerated response” to prison security concerns, and that the prison could easily accommodate Wolf without compromising prison security. This excessive ban violated both the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA.
Shidler v. Moore:
A federal court in Indiana recently allowed a prisoner’s claims for monetary damages under RLUIPA to go forward. The inmate, Garry Earl Shidler, sued officials at his prior housing unit for forbidding him to engage in communal worship. Although he has since been moved to a new unit, the court allowed Shidler’s RLUIPA claims and First Amendment claims to go forward, reasoning that his claims were not moot because monetary damages might be available. The court also chose to analyze Shidler’s RFRA claims under RLUIPA, since RFRA cannot be applied to state and local authorities.